The paper proposes to treat agent awareness as a form of knowledge, breaking the tradition in the existing literature on awareness. It distinguishes the de re and de dicto forms of such knowledge. The work introduces two modalities capturing these forms and formally specifies their meaning using a version of 2D-semantics. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system describing the interplay between the two proposed modalities and the standard "knowledge of the fact" modality.

Traditionally, an agent's beliefs would come from what the agent can see, hear, or sense. In the modern world, beliefs are often based on the data available to the agents. In this work, we investigate a dynamic logic of such beliefs that incorporates public announcements of data. The main technical contribution is a sound and complete axiomatisation of the interplay between data-informed beliefs and data announcement modalities. We also describe a non-trivial polynomial model checking algorithm for this logical system.

In many real-world situations, there is often not enough information to know that a certain strategy will succeed in achieving the goal, but there is a good reason to believe that it will. The paper introduces the term ``doxastic'' for such strategies. The main technical contribution is a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between doxastic strategy and belief modalities.

An operation is called covert if it conceals the identity of the actor; it is called clandestine if the very fact that the operation is conducted is concealed. The paper proposes a formal semantics of clandestine operations and introduces a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between the distributed knowledge modality and a modality capturing coalition power to conduct clandestine operations.

Two approaches to AI, neural networks and symbolic systems, have been proven very successful for an array of AI problems. However, neither has been able to achieve the general reasoning ability required for human-like intelligence. It has been argued that this is due to inherent weaknesses in each approach. Luckily, these weaknesses appear to be complementary, with symbolic systems being adept at the kinds of things neural networks have trouble with and vice-versa. The field of neural-symbolic AI attempts to exploit this asymmetry by combining neural networks and symbolic AI into integrated systems. Often this has been done by encoding symbolic knowledge into neural networks. Unfortunately, although many different methods for this have been proposed, there is no common definition of an encoding to compare them. We seek to rectify this problem by introducing a semantic framework for neural-symbolic AI, which is then shown to be general enough to account for a large family of neural-symbolic systems. We provide a number of examples and proofs of the application of the framework to the neural encoding of various forms of knowledge representation and neural network. These, at first sight disparate approaches, are all shown to fall within the framework's formal definition of what we call semantic encoding for neural-symbolic AI.

This paper explores relational syllogistic logics, a family of logical systems related to reasoning about relations in extensions of the classical syllogistic. These are all decidable logical systems. We prove completeness theorems and complexity results for a natural subfamily of relational syllogistic logics, parametrized by constructors for terms and for sentences.

If an agent, or a coalition of agents, has a strategy, knows that she has a strategy, and knows what the strategy is, then she has a know-how strategy. Several modal logics of coalition power for know-how strategies have been studied before. The contribution of the article is three-fold. First, it proposes a new class of know-how strategies that depend on the intelligence information about the opponents' actions. Second, it shows that the coalition power modality for the proposed new class of strategies cannot be expressed through the standard know-how modality. Third, it gives a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between the coalition power modality with intelligence and the distributed knowledge modality in games with imperfect information.

We assume that the values of propositional variables are not defined Discounting future costs and rewards is a common in the terminal state t. The agent a has multiple actions in practice in accounting, game theory, and machine each game state. These actions are depicted in Figure 1 using learning. In spite of this, existing logics for reasoning directed edges. The cost of each action to agent a is shown as about strategies with cost and resource constraints a label on the directed edge. For instance, the directed edge do not account for discounting. The paper from state w to state u with label 2 means that the agent a proposes a sound and complete logical system for has an action with cost 2 to transition the game from state w reasoning about budget-constrained strategic abilities to state u. Transitioning to the terminal state t represents the that incorporates discounting into its semantics.

The ability of an agent to comprehend a sentence is tightly connected to the agent's prior experiences and background knowledge. The paper suggests to interpret comprehension as a modality and proposes a complete bimodal logical system that describes an interplay between comprehension and knowledge modalities.

To talk about Reasoning, it's important to understand how we got here. This article covers what I call the pre-history of Classical AI -- those parts of the story that happened before the invention of modern computers (pre 1950s) but are crucial to understanding why we believe that AI is possible. This is part 2 in a series on Reasoning. Like most things, the very beginnings of classical AI is rooted in philosophy, and starts in the ancient world (the Greeks, Indians, and Chinese all had some early forms of logic). But, as I'm not a masochist we start in more contemporary times with two big ideas that lay the foundation for modern AI: The development of logic was humanity's first great attempt at mechanizing intelligence, and the basis for modern logic lies with George Boole, Charles Pierce, and Gottlob Frege.